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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BONNIE L. RANDALL, for-
merly BONNIE L. BRICKER, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
DANNYE. BRICKER, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE.i.'1ENT OF THE CASE 
Civil No. 16230 
This is an action by Plaintiff-Respondent Bonnie L. 
Randall, formerly, Bonnie L. Bricker, to renew a judgment 
based upon chil~. ~::-1~,2.f..1;• that was originally entered on 
__ ,.,.,..,__ -
February 26, 1970. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Both Plaintiff-Respondent Sonnie L. Randall and 
Defendant-Appellant Danny E. Bricker moved for swmnary 
judgment and the lower court held that: 
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1. The divorce court in the State of Utah did 
not maintain jurisdiction over the Appellant while he was 
______ ...... _ -- ~------~-" 
t~,:_~~X a.~-si::;:t f~_om ~~e sta~e, for the PUIP_9-se_?_! 
renewing a judgment based upon child support; 
---- ... ~-,.--.. --.·-- -"--·~"~,,...._~ ... "' . 
2. Absence from the state tolls the statute of 
limitations, regardless of whether the Utah court maintained 
jurisdiction over the Appellant and whether service of 
process could have been effected; 
3. Respondent is entitled to renew her judgment 
----------··--·--·--- .... -
even though she filed her complaint to renew said judgment 
in excess of eight years from the date of the original 
-·· judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of summary judgment in 
favor of Respondent and requests that summary judgment in 
favor of Appellant be granted, or, in the alternative, seeks 
a remand to the district court for trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Judgment in the amount of $2, 150. 00 was ent.~led 
against the Appellant on the 26th day of February, 1970. 
-- ._,., 
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based upon support paym_:n~s allegedly due and owing purs~~I,l.t 
tc a prior divorce decree. (R.29,30) Appellant was not 
~ ...... -·- -,_ ~ ,~. ·--- ... ..... ·--...--. 
(R.29) On or about 
... ___ ~ -· - -·-- ··" 
June 30, 1978, (approximately eight years and four months 
-:.,;- - . ...-~-· - - ~-~------
after the entry of said judgment) Plaintiff-Respondent filed 
___, 
a complaint to renew said judgment. (R.2,3) 
------............ ~-~~--, ~ -~-- .. -. ~--.. 
During the period of time between February 26, 
1970, and June 30, 1978, Appellant resided in North Carolina 
for a pe~od in exces.:._ ~~. (R.27) While in North 
·- __ .. -------
Carolina, Appellant made suppo:t p~~ei;£_~,. ~<?,. t;.l.le .~~4.w,t 
- ~ - -- ... 
by check that had his address where personal s~r_V:l:.,<;~,_, .. Q.f, 
---- --- ,.,~ -d.. -- .- ........ -. . ' 
process could be e~~~.£.t;..ed..__p.rint;:eq _ _.th~n. (R. 27) On or 
about the 2nd day of September, 1974, while Appellant was 
------------------____...... ~---.. 
residing in North Carolina, Respondent did, in fact, serve 
.~ .... 
--------~ 
Appellant, with an Order to Show Cause in connection with 
said divorce action. (R. 27, 31) 
Respondent knew, or could have known, with little 
effort, Appellant's whereabouts the entire time he resided 
in North Carolina. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONDENT'S ACTIO:i HEREIN IS BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
It is uncontested that Respondent filed her compla: 
to renew the judgment eight years and four months from the 
date said judgment was entered. Section 78-12-22, Utah Code 
Ann., 1953, limits plaintiff's rights to bring an action 
"to enforce any liability due ... for failure to provide 
---·--· support or maintenance for dependent children," to eight 
years. The only issue is whether Respondent falls within an 
exception to said statute of limitation. 
Respondent's only defense to the statute of limit· 
ation was her allegation that Appe_l}an_t was abs_e!lt-~.rom the 
----~..-_.....-~-- .... ..--.--.-.>J 
state, which tolled the limitation. Section 78-12-35, ~ 
.....,__. ____ .. _ ...... d ~ 
----- .. 
Code Ann., 1953, states: 
" ... [I]f after a cause of action accrues 
he departs from the state, the time of his 
absence is not part of the time limited for 
the commencement of the action." 
Appellant is not denying that he was out of the 
state in excess of one year, however, Ap_pellant cl§l~!;!S that 
Section 78-12-35, which Respondent solely relies upon, is 
not applicable in this case. 
-4-
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Absence from the state does toll the statute of 
limitations except under certain circumstances as outlined 
in the case of Snyder '!..;_Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 
915, 916-17 (1964). This Court held that where the Utah 
court maintained jurisdiction over the defendant, the 
---- • .... ··-, • ,,,,._ - .. -._.. _... ,-'. ·--- --··· _,,._---:;..,l::i"'i--t\"';'•r: .. _, ,. •;., ....... . 
defendant's absence did not toll the statute of limitationsJ 
- -. -·- ·- - .•• i;. ,.,,._...,..._..,,, • ..,..,,;,,..~ -~ -p .. l ..,.. .. ._..............-,., 
and Section 78-12-35 was inapplicable. The court explained 
~- _. __ ... .....,._._ .. _.,,.._ 
that the objective of Section 78-12-35 was "to prevent a 
defendant from depriving plaintiff of the opportunity of 
suing him by absenting himself from the state during the 
period of limitation." The court then concluded: 
"[Defendants] were thus not 'absent' from the state 
in the sense contemplated by the statute, that 
is, unavailable for the service of process. 
Therefore, the plaintiff was not prevented from 
commencing her action at any time she desired. 
That being so, there exists no reason for tolling 
the running of the statute. When the reason for 
the rule is gone, the rule should vanish with it. 
* * * * 
[I]t is our opinion that for the reasons 
we have hereinabove expressed, the view which is 
sounder and better considered is that followed 
by the greater number of jurisdictions, that 
where the plaintiff could have pursued her remedy 
at any time she desired, she was obliged to commence 
her action within the statute of limitations or it 
is barred. (Emphasis added) 
The court reasoned that the policy considerations and legis-
lative intent behind the statute of limitations would be 
-5-
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circumvented if the limitations could be tolled indefinite['! 
because of defendant's absence, when plaintiff could com-
mence a suit and serve process at any desired time. 
Snyder Y..:_ Clune, impliedly overrules Keith-O'Brien 
Company Y.:_ Snyder, 51 Utah 227, 169 P. 954 (1917), and 
Buell Y.:_ Duchesne Mercantile Company, 64 Utah 391, 231 P. !1' 
(1924). 
This rule of law as outlined in Snyder v. Clune 
~,.A.,.,__- -
is consistent with the overwhelming maj or~ty of_ t~c:.01:1rts 
-· in other jurisdictions. The Supreme Court of Arizona definec 
"absence from the state" to mean "out of the state in the 
sense that service of process in any of the methods authoriz1: 
by rule or statute cannot be made upon the defendant to 
secure personal jurisdiction by the trial court." Selby~ 
Karman, 110 Ariz. 522, 521 P.2d 609, 611 (1974). 
In Lipe Y.:_ Javelin Tire Company, Inc., 96 Ida. 
723, 536 P.2d 291, 294-95 (1975), the court held that where 
the defendant who was absent from the state could have been 
located for service of process by reasonably diligent efforti 
and the Idaho Court had continuing jurisdiction over the 
absent defendant, the statute of limitations was not tolled 
by reason of defendant's absence. 
-6-
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,e: 
ts 
For similar holdings, see Tarter~ INSCO, 550 
P.2d 905 (Wyo. 1976); Summerrise v. Stephens, 454 P.2d 224 
(Wash. 1969); Kennedy~ Lynch, 84 N.M. 479, 513 P.2d 1261 
(1973); McCullough~ Boyd, 475 P.2d 610 (Okla. 1970); ~ 
v. Vonsild, 541 P.2d 528 (Nev. 1975); and 55 A.L.R.3d 1158 
and Supplement. 
The basis of this rule is stated in 55 A.L.R.3d 
1158, 1165: 
" ... [T]o toll the statute of limitations 
during the absence or nonresidence of a party 
who continues to be amenable to suit would allow 
a plaintiff in such a situation to postpone 
commencement of proceedings even though he has 
the capacity to obtain jurisdiction, and would 
therefore be ~nconsistent with the purpose of the 
general statute of limitations, which is designed 
to eliminate stale claims." 
In the present case, Appellant was subject to the 
jurisdiction of Utah's divorce court during the entire time 
he was out of state. 
II. UTAH COURTS HAVE CONTINUING JURISDICTION OVER 
A PARTY TO A DIVORCE ACTION WHEN SAID PARTY LEAVES THE STATE. 
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Ann., 1953, expressly 
states that the court maintains continuing jurisdiction over 
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the parties in matters relating to support. This was clear-
ly pointed out in the case of Plumb ?...:._ Plumb, 555 P. 2d 1205. 
1206 (Utah 1976) where the husband had served his ex-wife, 
who was residing in South Dakota, with an Order to Show 
Cause and the Court held "the parties were personally sub-
ject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court under 30-3·i 
U.C.A., 1953." 
In the case of Brown?...:._ Vonsild, 541 P.2d 528 (ilev. 
1975) the divorced wife brought an action for arrearages in 
child support against the divorced husband who had been absem 
from the state. Said action was brought subsequent to the 
statutory limitation period but the wife claimed that said 
limitation period was tolled because of the defendant's 
absence from the state. The court held that since the 
husband was continuously subject to service in the original 
divorce proceedings, the statute which would have tolled the 
limitation period because of defendant's absence, was inap· 
plicable and the wife's claim was barred. 
Utah's Long Arm statute also vests jurisdiction 
over a party who has left the state, as it relates to 
claims for support and maintenance. Section 78-27-24, ~ 
Code Ann., 1953, as amended, states: 
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"Any person . . . whether or not a citizen 
or resident of this state . . . submits him-
self, and if an individual, his personal 
representative, to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state as to any claim arising 
from: 
* * * * 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce and sep-
arate maintenance, the maintenance in this 
state of a matrimonial domicile at the time 
the claim arose or the commission in this state 
of the act giving rise to the claim." 
Utah's Long Arm statute further states in Section 
78-27-28, "Subject to the applicable statute of limitations, 
jurisdiction established under this act shall be exercised 
regardless of when the claim arose." (Emphasis added) 
There would be an inherent inconsistency in the statutory 
language if the court were to hold that the Long Arm statute, 
giving jurisdiction over !!£!!.residents, is "subject to the 
applicable statute of limitations," yet, the said statute of 
limitations is tolled while the defendant is a !!£!!.resident. 
There would never be a limitations. Since this position is 
absurd, it appears clear that the legislators did not intend 
that defendant's absence from the state would toll the 
statutory limitations when the Utah court has jurisdiction 
by reason of the Long Arm statute. 
-9-
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Respondent argued at the trial court that the 
----~ ..... ~·· ·-
domestic court did not have jurisdiction over the Appellant 
while absent from the state, for the purpose of renewing a 
judgment based upon child support. In other words, once 
-
child support becomes a judgment, the domes tic court s~n.i~how 
loses its right to renew that judgment. 
By accepting Respondent's position, the trial 
court significantly narrowed the domestic court's authority 
I 
and jurisdiction over nonresidents. Section 30-3-5, Utah Code 
Ann., 1953, and the cases cited by this Court which interpret 
said language, are all very general and broad in terms of 
granting jurisdiction by the Utah court over a nonresident 
party. The Long Arm statute cited above also has broad, 
nonrestrictive language. A judgment based upon support, is 
still directly related to "support and maintenance", which 
is the jurisdictional foundation of a domestic court, regard· 
less of whether a party temporarily leaves the state. 
This Court held in Seeley~ Park, 532 P.Zd 684 
(1975), that "installments under a decree of divorce for 
alimony or support of minor children become final judgmel!f1 
as soon as they are due." (Emphasis added) If a support 
-10-
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payment becomes a final judgment as soon as it is due, the 
1970 judgment herein had to have been a renewal of previous 
past due support payments (judgments) which had accrued 
prior to said 1970 judgment. Either the domestic court had 
the power to renew judgments, or the 1970 judgment herein is 
not a renewal and the limitation period would commence at 
the time each support payment was due, and not at the time of 
the 1970 judgment. This would require a reversal of the 
summary judgment granted herein since the trial court used 
the 1970 judgment for the basis of its decision. 
The domestic court has traditionally had broad 
authority and jurisdiction concerning child support. A 
judge may find the defaulting party in contempt of court for 
failing to pay past child support payments (which payments 
are judgments, Seeley~ Park, supra). The law allows 
special privileges to judgments based upon child support, 
such as in the area of garnishment, execution, and homestead 
rights. 
In the case (such as the present case) where both 
parties were residents at the time of the divorce, the 
legislators have clearly stated their intention to allow 
the court to maintain jurisdiction over said parties, even 
-11-
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though one of the parties may subsequently move from the 
county or state: 
"The court shall have continuing jurisdiction 
to make such subsequent changes or new orders 
with respect to the support and maintenance 
of the parties, the custody of the children 
and their support and maintenance, or the dis-
tribution of the property as shall be reasonable 
and necessary." Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Ann., 
1953. (Emphasis added) 
A child support payment, whether delinquent for a 
day or for years, is still "support and maintenance" of the 
children. Just because a child support payment becomes 
delinquent, thereby becoming a judgment, does not alter the 
fact that said payment is for the support and maintenance of 
said children. 
The trial court below ruled that once a child suppo:-
payment becomes a judgment, the domestic court no longer 
maintains jurisdiction over the nonresident party. Such a 
position would encourage delinquent fathers to intentionally 
leave the state for the purpose of taking away the Utah court'· 
jurisdiction to enforce child support payments. This positio:. 
would further mean that the court only has continuing juris· 
diction over future support payments, and not past payments. 
Clearly, such a position would be bad policy and against t~ 
legislative intent and prior judicial law. 
-12-
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In the present case, Respondent could have com-
-------
menced this action at any time while Appellant was absen~ 
~· ·--- ···--· -- --·-----· --'-~.,_ ~_,,_,_ ..-·,..-llY,.: .. ~ ..... ,- ... ~-·--·~"f_,, 
of the Long Arm statute. Respondent could have effected 
service of process whenever she desired, which is evidenced 
by the fact that Respondent did serve an Order to Show Cause 
upon Appellant while he was in ~orth Carolina. (R.31) 
Respondent knew, or could have known, with little effort, 
where the Appellant was located the entire time he was 
absent from the state. While in North Carolina, Appellant 
was making child support payments to the Respondent with 
checks that had his address printed thereon. Service of 
process could have b~en accomplished by any number of ways 
as described in Rule 4(f)(l), (2), and (3), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, or Section 78-27-25, Utah Code Ann., 1953, 
as amended, but, Respondent was derelict and failed to 
corru:nence her action within the eight year statutory limitation 
period. Therefore, the Respondent's claim is barred and 
should be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted this ,/~~ay of April, 1979. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN, KENNEDY & 
POWELL 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _/_f::_ day of April, 
1979, two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant were 
mailed, postage prepaid, to Robert F. Orton, Esq., HANSEN 
& ORTON, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent, 2020 Beneficial 
Life Tower, 36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84lll. 
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